We turn our a ention to the elephant in the room of data protection, which is none other than the simple and obvious question: "Who's tracking sensitive domains?". Despite a fast-growing amount of work on more complex facets of the interplay between privacy and the business models of the Web, the obvious question of who collects data on domains where most people would prefer not be seen, has received rather limited a ention. First, we develop a methodology for automatically annotating websites that belong to a sensitive category, e.g., as de ned by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). en, we extract the third party tracking services included directly, or via recursive inclusions, by the above mentioned sites. Having analyzed around 30k sensitive domains, we show that such domains are tracked, albeit less intensely than the mainstream ones. Looking in detail at the tracking services operating on them, we nd well known names, as well as some less known ones, including some specializing on speci c sensitive categories.
INTRODUCTION
e public and scienti c interest around data protection, privacy, and their relationship with new services and business models on the Web is reaching an all-time-high. e intense debates and the pressing needs for evidence-based policymaking have triggered lots of measurement work in the area [8, 9, 13, 32, 49, 50, 62, 63, 72, 77, 78] .
Research in many cases has jumped directly to asking very general questions such as "Who is tracking?" [54, 63, 72] and "How is tracking done?" [1, 60, 69] , or proposing holistic solutions to privacy challenges [70, 84] . Apart from the technical di culties related to such endeavours, de nitional, ethical, and other debates make these ma ers even more complex. E.g., to what extent is it justi able to collect and sell end-user information in exchange for a free service? is question is inadvertently present in any study of tracking on the Web, as well as in any proposal for stopping it or conducting it in a di erent manner. Opinions on the above question vary, and this makes it di cult to reach a clear conclusion when analyzing the ndings of general studies about tracking.
Yet, there exist some ma ers related to privacy in which most people agree. For example, most would not prefer to be tracked when visiting domains involving sensitive topics such as religion, health and sexual orientation.
is is so evident that it even appears as an explicit clause in most data protection regulations, including the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [28] that considers as sensitive personal data any data "revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, also genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural persons sex life or sexual orientation". Other governments and administrations around the world, e.g., in California (California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) [71] ), Canada [58] , Israel [74] , Japan [61] , and Australia [57] , are following similar paths [38, 43] . e public has taken notice and has started to make use of the new regulations. Indeed, in the rst seven months of GDPR there have been 95k led complaints relating to it [29] ; in France, this represented an increase of more than 60% [43] compared to the previous year.
In this paper, we investigate and report on the entities that track and collect data in web domains where most people would rather prefer not to be seen by third parties. Being tracked on a cancer discussion forum, a gay dating site, or a news site with non-mainstream political a nity, is at the core of some of the most fundamental anxieties that many people have about their online privacy. Many people visit such sites in incognito mode. is can provide some privacy in some cases but it has been shown that tracking can be performed regardless [3, 33, 82] . In any case, our focus here is on answering whether such domains are being tracked.
antifying the consequences of such tracking goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Challenges
Answering the seemingly straightforward question posed by this paper is far from simple. As mentioned already, categories such as health and sexual orientation, have been , ,
Costas Iordanou, Georgios Smaragdakis, and Nikolaos Laoutaris recorded on data protection laws, albeit at a high and abstract level. is makes sense, since such laws are meant to be interpreted by humans in courts of law. us, following a complaint, it will fall upon a data protection authority, or eventually a judge, to decide whether tracking people visiting a particular website violates any clause about sensitive data, a ma er on which we do not have any opinion and consider outside the scope of our work. e objective of our work, however, is to answer at scale whether sensitive domains are tracked, and to do this we rst need to collect thousands of such domains. is cannot be done manually by picking one by one individual domains and, therein, lies our rst major challenge: "how can we classify arbitrary domains programmatically as sensitive or not and collect enough of them for a systematic analysis of tracking?". e obvious approach of compiling a list of textual descriptions directly from legal documents and classifying based on them, leads to ambiguous results. For example, looking up the term Health at commercial classi cation systems such as Alexa [5] and SimilarWeb [68] , we obtain domains about sports, healthy living, and healthy foods, as well as domains about chronic and sexually transmi ed diseases. Manually distinguishing the truly sensitive among the not so sensitive ones, is not a scalable approach.
Even if one could compile large lists of truly sensitive domains, extracting and identifying the trackers operating on them remains a formidable task. is is due to problems such as distinguishing tracking from non-tracking third party domains [31, 65, 72] , complex recursive mechanisms used by trackers to invoke one another along multi-hop tracking chains, or active e orts by many of them to avoid programmatic detection and blocking [53].
Contributions
We develop a scalable and accurate methodology for classifying sensitive domains across di erent categories, including those mentioned in GDPR. Our approach requires a small manual e ort to pick categories that are truly sensitive from Curlie.org [23] , a large collection of URLs with annotated categories provided by a global community of volunteer editors. is can be done easily due to the hierarchical nature of Curlie.org. Scanning, for example, the Health branch for truly sensitive sub-branches takes us less than ve minutes. Having done that, we immediately have access to thousands of well-labeled domains that can be used as training sets for deriving di erent Machine Learning (ML) classi ers. e resulting classi ers can then be used to detect sensitive domains among arbitrary sets of unlabeled domains, such as Top-K lists according to popularity. Having such classi ers is, thus, an important building block for tracking services that track people on sensitive domains on the Web. for the bene t of other researchers and Moving on, we draw upon recent state-of-the-art work [13, 50, 63] to implement a powerful methodology for detecting third party trackers operating on large collections of sensitive domains. Our methodology is able to detect complex, multilayer inclusion of trackers [7] , as well as the methods used for exchanging information among them. We apply our detection methodology upon the sensitive domains that we used from Curlie.org to train our classi ers.
Findings
Analyzing around 30k domains that belong in sensitive categories, almost exclusive in the ve sensitive categories as de ned by GDPR, we conclude that:
• Our carefully ltered sets of sensitive domains are indeed tracked by a multitude of entities. e median number of third party trackers found on sites of sensitive categories such as Health, Political Beliefs, and Sexual Orientation, is 10, 7, and 6, respectively. is median is smaller than the corresponding one among TopK domains (17), yet alarmingly high given the nature of these sites.
• On the top positions in terms of coverage we nd the same trackers present at non-sensitive domains, which is again surprising given the very sensitive character of the domains we analyse. • We examine in more detail how popular trackers get into those domains, i.e., whether they are intentionally present by being included directly by rst party domains, or appear unintentionally through recursive inclusions initiated by other third parties. We nd that in the majority of cases the presence is intentional. • Going beyond the mainstream trackers, we identify several niche trackers that are absent from non sensitive domains but have clear presence on sensitive ones. Investigating them further, we nd several ones that focus and advertise on their web-sites their ability to track particularly sensitive categories. • We study the communication pa erns through socalled cookie synchronization [11, 18, 60] between mainstream and niche trackers and nd that the two o en exchange information. We discuss potential consequences of allowing niche trackers access information held by mainstream ones. Step 1: Manual Filtering
Step 2: Training
Step 3: Classification Figure 1 : Flowchart of our Methodology.
Our methodology allows automating an additional re nement step that takes us from generic de nitions of sensitive terms to deciding whether a certain domain in the above categories is indeed sensitive, in the sense that most people would rather not be seen visiting it. Our methodology requires a minimal manual ne tuning (something in the order of 5 minutes) and a er that it is capable to accurately train machine learning classi ers that can be used to detect truly sensitive domains in arbitrary lists of domains (e.g., in TopK lists from Alexa [4] and other taxonomy systems). Combining this with our automated methodology for extracting tracking parties from lists of domains, opens up the road to pu ing in place a fully automated process for identifying sensitive domains and the trackers operating on them. In this paper we do this for analysis purposes but it is conceivable that our methods can also be used for proactive monitoring and enforcement. Figure 1 depicts a summary of our methodology. At a very high level, the methodology involves three steps:
Step 1 (Manual ltering): An expert user picks from a crowdsourced taxonomy of domains the branches below a generic sensitive term such as Health that seem to be truly sensitive.
Step 2 (Training): From the selected branches we retrieve thousand of domains and use them to train a classi er.
Step 3 (Classication): We apply the trained classi er to arbitrary lists of domains in which we want to detect other sensitive domains beyond the ones used in our training set. Next, we elaborate on the details of the above three steps.
Utilizing Labeled Websites
To achieve the desired re nement, we need a rich enough taxonomy and a fast way to pick truly sensitive categories from it. We decided to use Curlie [23], one of the largest humanedited directories of the Web. Curlie relies on category editors, i.e., experienced editors who specialize on a nite set of categories. is group of editors makes up the majority of the Curlie community (around 92k active editors). All new editors apply to edit in small categories at rst, and then apply to edit additional areas a er they have accumulated a number of edits. Community's senior editors are responsible for evaluating new editors' applications. is "'Wikipedia" style of indexing, helps in assuring a high quality labeling of URLs. Curlie contains more than 3.5 Millions annotated websites. ese websites are full path URLs, not just second level domains like in Alexa [5] and SimilarWeb [68] .
is is a big advantage, as the frontpage of a website is not always representative of the entire content of a large and complex domain. For example, the frontpage of a University may not be annotated as a sensitive domain, but a website that is hosted in the medical school that describes methods to treat cancer could be annotated as sensitive. Curlie, historically known as the Open Directory Project (ODP) and DMOZ[25] directory, is open source and free for use by all. Other directories are either not available to the public, e.g., Google AdWords [35] , or are subscription-based and require payment, e.g., Alexa and SimilarWeb. Although it is believed that these commercial directories are also human-edited, there is no information on their annotation methodologies and way of work. Also, several taxonomies related to commercial campaign planners avoid including very ne grained sensitive terms. For the above reasons we have picked Curlie.
Typically, for each category, there is only one category that matches -the rst-level category. For each rst-level category, there are a few second-level categories and tens of third-level categories for each second-level category. For example, for the category Health, there is one rst-level category, also called Health, and 47 second-level categories. e user of our methodology, has to manually select the rst-level category, and then for the selected one, the second-level categories that are considered sensitive. is is the only manual component in our methodology, and the selection process takes less than 5 minutes for each (generic) sensitive category. Studies have shown that involving humans at this stage can signi cantly improve the quality of the follow-up automated process [6] . For example, in the case of Health, questionably sensitive second-level categories such as Education, Employment, Animal, Healthcare Industry, are not selected, whereas second-level categories such as Conditions and Diseases, Addictions, and Mental Health are selected. Following this, a list of labeled sensitive websites becomes readily available by selecting all the websites under the kept second-level categories (all levels). For example, in the case of Health, we manually selected six second-level sub-categories and this gave us 7,144 unique URLs from 3,989 domains of , ,
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Crawling
We have built a fully automated crawler using Google Puppeteer [37], NodeJS [56] , and Google Chrome [36] , and used it to visit and render all the websites that have been selected in the previous step. If a website is not available a er three a empts or the crawler receives an "HTTP 404 -Page not Found" error for a speci c URL, then the website/URL is discarded.
For each visited website the crawler collects two types of information. First, the crawler collect the full HTML code of the website, and second, all the HTTP(S) requests that are triggered during rendering time. Towards that end, the crawler utilizes a website scrolling functionality in order to trigger additional rst and third party requests that are only initiated when a speci c portion of the website is within the visible area of the web browser.
is can happen due to lazy-loading [21] optimization algorithms. In the same path, we also impose an additional delay (1 minute) a er the window.onload() event is triggered in order to give time to any tracking scripts and advertisements (if any) to fully load before we collect data. Note that since we operate at the browser level we can also observe and record encrypted (HTTPS) requests.
In the following sections we will explain how we use the collected data (a) to train a classi er to identify websites belonging to sensitive categories, and (b) to quantify the presence of third party domains in websites belonging to such categories.
Selecting and Training a Classi er
Our goal in this paper is not to propose a new classi cation algorithm or suggest improvements to existing classi cation methods, but rather to combine well known and well understood classi cation algorithms and o -the-shelf tools [83] with the right set of data to produce an automated methodology for identifying sensitive domains across di erent categories.
A number of existing classi cation algorithms are suitable for text classi cation. Some examples are, k-nearestneighbor (KNN) [16, 39, 47] , Naïve Bayes [24, 26, 46] , support vector machines (SVM) [19, 20, 73, 85] , decision tree (DT) [27, 75, 79] , neural network (NN) [40, 52] and di erent variations [55] , maximum entropy [22, 47] , etc.
We opt for using a Naïve Bayes classi cation algorithm. To be more speci c, a multinomial Naïve Bayes algorithm, a single supervised learning classi er that can predict multiple classes. Our choice relies on the following observations. First, it has simple and easy training and classi cation stages [73] . Second, it is a fast learning algorithm that can handle large numbers of features and classes [19, 51] . ird, the algorithm has already been tested and proved to work well using the old version of Curlie (DMOZ) categorization database [59] . Fourth, it has shown comparable, and in some cases, be er performance compared to other simple and easy to use classi cation algorithms [2, 76] . Finally, multiple o -the-shelf implementations are publicly available for di erent programming languages and frameworks, thereby easily allowing other researchers to reproduce and validate our results.
2.3.1 Input selection and pre-processing. In Section 2.1 we explained how we collected our labeled dataset. In this section we provide more details on how we use it as a training input to our classi er.
For each visited website we have two source of information, the full HTML code and the list of HTTP(S) requests as observed during the rendering time of the page. From the HTML code we exclude all the non-visible elements (JavaScript, CSS, etc.) except the HTML ¡META¿ tag. From all the visible elements (human readable content) we extract all the text. We call this input source, the website content (C). e ¡META¿ tag contains information related to the website, such as, the title of the page, a short description and keywords describing the page content. We call this input source meta-data (M).
Using the HTTP(S) requests, we also consider a third source of input, that is, all HTTP(S) requests towards domains other than the one that our crawler is actually visiting (a.k.a, third party domains). We call this input source third-party domains (TPD). We also consider the third party domains that are present via recursive inclusion. In this case, we use the domain of the third party as well as the level of recursive inclusion as part of the domain name (i.e., domainA.com-0, domainB.com-1, etc. ). We call this input source TPD-LVL. Later, we will examine if classi cation based on meta-data or presence of third-party domains can be as precise as based on content.
In the case of the two input sources, content and metadata, we apply some standard preprocessing steps, such as, (1) language detection in order to exclude any websites with non English text, (2) transform all le ers in lower case format and (3) remove any stop words (i.e., a, the, etc. ). Finally, (4) we set a minimum word length to three le ers, numbers, or any combination of the two. In the case of the TPD and TPD-LVL input no preprocessing is required since we only have a list of domain names and not a free form text.
Feature engineering and training.
With respect to feature selection, we consider two algorithms as follow:
, , Bag-of-Words (BoW): It is a popular Information Retrieval (IR) technique to represent text as a multiset of its words by disregarding grammar, but, keeping multiplicity, i.e., the number of appearances of a word in a document or a corpus of documents. Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF): It is a popular IR numerical statistic that is intended to re ect how important a word is to a document. e TF-IDF value increases proportionally to the number of times a word appears within a document and inversely proportionally to its corresponding frequency among other documents.
During this step each feature selection algorithm searches through all possible combinations of a ributes in the data (word term in our input) to nd which subset of features (words) works best for prediction. We use 70% of each dataset during the training phase and the remaining 30% during the validation phase.
Classifying Unlabeled Websites
We can use the trained classi er to identify additional websites belonging to the number of classes that our classi er is trained to identify. In order to achieve that, we can use any list of websites that we want to examine. en, we need to follow the methodology described above, that is, use a crawler to fetch the HTML code of the websites and apply the preprocessing step. Depending on the number of classes that our classi er is able to identify, during the prediction phase the classi er returns a vector of probabilities between 0 and 1 with equal length as the number of classes that it can identify. e position with the highest probability "P" de nes the prediction category with the corresponding probability score "P". If the website being classi ed does not belong to any of the sensitive categories that the classi er is trained to nd, the probability vector will include only small values.
CLASSIFIER EVALUATION
In this section, we assess the accuracy of classi ers trained by labeled data as described in Section 2.3. We rst describe in more detail the di erent datasets we used. en, we evaluate the accuracy of di erent classi ers on those labeled data as well as their sensitivity to di erent parameters. Lastly, we assess the accuracy and robustness of the classi ers when applied to unlabeled domains from TopK lists.
Datasets
To bootstrap our study we consider the ve generic sensitive categories according to GDPR [28] , namely, Health, Ethnicity, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Political Beliefs (the category Biometric Data is not applicable to our study). We identify the relevant categories in Curlie and by allocating less than ve minutes for each category we select the rstlevel and second-level categories. en, we consider all the labeled websites for each of the ve categories. For the statistics of the number of rst-/second-level categories and labeled websites per category, please see Table 1 (second and third column). Following the methodology described in Section 2.3.1, rst the orchestrated crawler downloads all the websites from each category, and second, we pre-process the downloaded data.
e result of this process is summarized in Ethical considerations: Due to the sensitive content of the websites, we decided not to use any real user or any personal identi er. e crawlers utilized IPs assigned to cloud providers and universities. Note also that since we crawl using scripted web-browsers we see all the content and HTTP(S) headers and don't have any issues due to transport layer encryption.
Classi cation Accuracy
Classi cation accuracy is de ned as the percentage score, from 0% (lowest) to 100% (the highest), that a classi er can accurately assign websites to the associated category. In this section, we investigate how di erent inputs (features), combinations and parameters can in uence our classi er's accuracy.
As a rst step, we have to assess which feature sets (available input options) are suitable for our classi cation task. Towards that end, and to avoid any bias, we consider an equal number of websites for each category. We also set the number of features to be three thousand in order to evaluate the di erent input options (we vary this later). e category with the minimum number of websites is Sexual Orientation with 1,956 (for the other categories, see Table 1 (last column)). us, for each of the other categories, we uniformly at random select 1,956 websites.
, ,
Costas Iordanou, Georgios Smaragdakis, and Nikolaos Laoutaris Following our results depicted in Table 2 , when the classi er extracts features only from the text content of the webpage (C), the classi cation accuracy is quite high. e accuracy with BoW is close to 80% and with TF-IDF above 84%. Using only the website meta-data (M) as feature source yields high classi cation accuracy, but signi cantly lower than when considering the text of the website both with BoW and TF-IDF. ird party domains, used directly (TPD) or annotated with the inclusion level (TPD-LVL) yield very bad classi cation accuracy, for both BoW and TF-IDF -close to half of the accuracy when considering the text content of the webpage (C). We also tested all the di erent combinations of feature sources, and as shown in Table 2 , the combination of website text content and meta-data with TF-IDF yields the best classi cation accuracy (85.66%).
3.2.1 Accuracy per category. We then turn our a ention to the classi cation accuracy per category. Notice that we use only a subset of the webpages in the classi er, thus, we would like to assess if the classi er is able to correctly classify the websites to the appropriate category. In Figure 2 we present the confusion matrix, i.e., table layout that allows visualization of the performance of our classi cation. Each raw of the confusion matrix represents the percentage of the instances in the actual class, while each column represents the percentage of the instances in a predicted class (sensitive category). A high-level observation is that the classi er predicts with high accuracy the class of the websites that belong to the same category (the darker the cell the be er). Nevertheless, there are some shadows that indicate that in some cases the classi er mis-predicts the class. A er closely investigating the di erent categories, we observe the following. For example, in the sexual orientation category, there are multiple websites (and Curlie subcategories) that are associated to a speci c type of sexuality, e.g., websites dedicated to only gay men or lesbian women, that do not share a lot of similar words in the webpage text (i.e. gay website use men related words and lesbian websites use women related words). In the case of Health and Sexual Orientation, we observe that in some URLs related to gay also discuss sexually transmi ed diseases. Overall the category where the classi er achieves the highest accuracy is Political Beliefs (88.3%) and the category with the lowest accuracy is Sexual Orientation (74.2%).
Feature sets.
Another indication that the classi cation is robust is the obvious relevancy of the features with the highest weight selected by the classi er. In Table 3 we list the top 10 features (out of the 3k) in each sensitive category. e classi er is using as an input the websites text content and meta-data as well as the TF-IDF algorithm for feature engineering. We observe that the keywords (top features), that are automatically generated by the classi er, are well suited to characterize each one of the sensitive categories.
3.2.3
Extending the Classifier beyond GDPR sensitive categories. Another advantage of the classi er is that as new categories are added as an input, it is possible to provide additional training and improve it. For this, we added as input another sensitive category, namely, Porn. All the quality characteristics of the classi er, such as, classi cation accuracy, list of features, and the confusion matrix were slightly improved. We build the list of Porn websites by manually selecting them from di erent blocking lists [30] related to adult content websites.
Sensitivity on the number of features
Next, we examine the e ect of the number of features used in the training of the classi er on the classi cation accuracy. Figure 3 shows the classi cation accuracy for each sensitive category as well as the overall accuracy, as the number of features increases. We present the results for Bag-of-Word and TF-IDF as feature engineering algorithms, see Figure 3 (a) and (b), respectively. For each sensitive category and feature engineering algorithms, the classi cation accuracy increases with the number of features. Our analysis shows that, for each and all categories, there is a "knee" in the classi cation accuracy when the number of features is around 1,000. From 3,000 features and onwards, the classi cation accuracy improvement is marginal. One important observation is that the converged classi cation accuracy varies across sensitive categories, but consistently, TF-IDF outperforms BoW across all categories. For the rest of the results presented in this paper, unless otherwise noted, we will use 3,000 features with textual content and meta-data information, and with TF-IDF for our classi cation. With regards to the feature engineering and training time for the classi er, in Table 4 , we report the execution time for the two best feature sources, namely, content and meta-data, as well as the execution time when both sources are used. All the experiments were executed on a MacBook Pro 2018 version. A rst observation is that the feature engineering time for content and meta-data does not depend on the number of features (ranging from 1k to 100k features) nor the feature engineering method. is is to be expected as the input is the same, i.e., the corpus of textual content and meta-data. e feature engineering algorithm, however, does depend on the input source. Utilizing only meta-data takes less than a second, where textual content takes about 13 seconds. e training time does depend on the number of features and the feature engineering method, as shown in Table 4 (last two columns), but this time is almost negligible. For either feature engineering algorithm, the training time increases only three times, when the set of features increases by three orders of magnitude. us, training of the classi er is very scalable. When we consider di erent feature engineering algorithms, TF-IDF not only yields be er classi cation accuracy than BoW, but is also faster. e training of our classi er with 3k features and TD-IDF takes only 23msec.
Performance of the Classi er on unlabeled data
Next, we evaluate the ability of the classi er trained with labeled sensitive domains from curlie.org to accurately classify unlabeled sensitive domains in TopK popular lists. As a showcase, we use the Alexa Top 20k list. We use the latest list on the day of crawling (March to April 2019). We decide to focus only on the top 20k as many of popular webpages are there and the churn is relative small [67] . A er the crawling and applying lters for English language and su cient text and meta-information we maintained 7,115 websites. We remind the reader that the main motivation for the training of such classi ers is to use them to automatically identify sensitive domains by ltering TopK lists and then use the identi ed domains to extract the trackers present on them for analysis or for compliance audits.
A er running our classi er on the above list we identify several sensitive domains across the di erent categories. We limit the number of selected websites to 1k out of the 7,115 from Alexa in order to be able to manually examine if indeed the predicted categories are correct or not. When the prediction probability threshold is set to a small value, such as 0.5 (50%), the classi er annotates 186 as sensitive. In more detail, we get 44 websites belonging to the category Porn, 15 related with Health, 64 with Political Beliefs, 9 with Sexual Orientation and nally 2 with Ethnicity. We manually investigated and con rmed that 134 out of the 186 annotated by the classi er were indeed sensitive and belonging to the corresponding discovered categories.
Our next objective is to optimize the threshold in order to maximize the number of discovered sensitive websites, but without mis-classifying many websites as sensitive (false positives). We remind the reader that our use case is to collect lots of sensitive websites from arbitrary lists to extract who is tracking them.
us, we are more sensitive to the precision (positives being real) rather than the recall ( nding all positives) of the classi cation.
In Figure 4 , we show how the percentage of true positive rate increases as the prediction probability threshold of the classi er increases. However, as the true positive rate increases, less sensitive websites (as annotated by our manual investigation) are identi ed as such. Moreover, the percentage of a total (134 out of a total 1k) true positive sensitive websites decreases slower than the true positive rate when probability threshold of the classi er increases. is suggests that we can achieve very high positive rate by missing a relative small number of true positive sensitive websites. As shown in Figure 4 , the true positive rate exceeds 90% (and more than 70% of the sensitive sites are identi ed as such) when the classi er's prediction probability threshold is 0.63.
TRACKERS ON SENSITIVE DOMAINS
In this section, we rst present in detail our methodology for detecting the presence of trackers on particular domains. en, we quantify the amount of tracking that takes place on sensitive domains. Finally, we identify and catalogize the tracking services operating on them.
Detection methodology ird party inclusion chains:
For each one of the rendered pages belonging to sensitive domains crawled as described in the previous section, we conduct the following. First, we detect third party domains by following all requests towards any domain beyond the one originally visited by our crawler. In order to identify if a third party domain is a tracker or not, one can use di erent lter lists and methodologies as descriped in [41, 72] . Nevertheless, we choose to include all third party domains in our dataset without any ltering in order to observe if any unknown third party tracker operate in sensitive category websites. As will be shown later, most of the third party domains encountered are indeed trackers.
Next, using the collected data we construct the third-party request inclusions for each webpage visit. To do so, we combine information related to each individual third-party request, such as, the request type (i.e., the "sub frame" type identi es an iFrame creations), the initiator URL (source) and request URL (destination) as reported by the "onBeforeSend-Headers" event listener, the iFrame id and other meta-data information as necessary. To correctly identify the referrer eld of a request when a third-party script is directly embedded in the rst-party domain content, we monitor , , all "sub frame" requests executed at the rst-party domain level [12] . We then assign the correctly inferred third-party domain to the newly created iFrame based on the request URL that is responsible for the iFrame creation.
An example of such inclusions is depicted in Figure 5 . At level 0 (top box) is the actual user-initiated visit to a speci c rst-party domain, in our example "mangporn.net" an adult content website. At level 1 (middle box) there are 5 di erent third-party domains that are directly included by the rstparty domain (publisher) henceforth referred to as Direct Inclusions. At level 2 (bo om box) there are 11 domains that are included by 3 di erent third-party domains already included by the publisher at level 1. We refer to such thirdparty domain inclusions above level 2 as Indirect Inclusions. Note that in our example, we use a website with only 2 levels of inclusion. In our dataset we have observed up to 9 levels.
To be able to understand the interaction between the di erent domains that we observe in each website, we introduce the notion of Inclusion chains. An inclusion chain is a path that connects domains based on the order of inclusion. Using Figure 5 , we can identify an inclusion chain between the rst-party domain "mangoporn.net" towards the thirdparty domain "a.discuscdn.com". e chain includes the following domains in the exact order: "mangoporn.net" → "disqus.com" → "a.disquiscdn.com". Overall in Figure 5 we have 13 such inclusion chains. Note here that all these inclusions are not visible in the static code of a page. ey appear only when one fully renders the page. For example, nytimes.com and nbcnews.com render their content and ads dynamically while the user scrolls the page. We overcome this issue as we explain in section 2.2. Table 5 summarized the number of sites per category, the total number of HTTP(S) requests in our crawling, and the number of unique third parties.
Are sensitive domains tracked?
ey most certainly are! and median number of third party requests per website in sensitive websites is signi cantly less than in TopK, there is a signi cant number of third party HTTP requests. e median number ranges from 14 (Ethnicity) up to 40 in (Porn). When we turn our a ention to third party domains, overall, the median and mean of third party full domains per website in sensitive websites is lower than this in TopK. Nevertheless, there are third party domains in sensitive websites, where visitors of such websites would prefer not to be tracked. Focusing on the sensitive categories, we notice that the number of third parties varies across categories. e median number of third parties in sensitive domains range from as high as 10 for Health related sites, to as low as 5 for Ethnicity related ones (when the corresponding median for TopK sites is 17). We also report the numbers for the second level domain, i.e., TLD+1. We do this as we want to remove bias due to ephemeral full domains that may be generated by some of the third parties in the corpus of the webpages we study. e qualitative observations, however, do not change. e corresponding median numbers when considering TLD+1 are 8 for Health (highest) and 4 for Ethnicity (lowest), when for TopK the corresponding number is 12. e qualitative observation remain the same also when we consider corporate relationships between domains (e.g., domains belonging to the same mother company [11] that although clearly less intense than in TopK popular domains (where we expect to observe a high number of third party HTTP(S) requests and domains [14, 15] ), an alarmingly high number of third parties is present on sensitive domains across all the considered categories.
Who is tracking on sensitive domains?
We present the names of the rst twenty third party domains with the highest cover in the TopK in Figure 6 and in the di erent sensitive categories that we consider in Figure 7 . A quick inspection reveals that all the encountered third parties belong to well known tracking services. We also observe that the top trackers on sensitive domains are the same ones known to have the highest tracking coverage among all domains on the web. eir coverage, although slightly lower than in TopK domains, remains impressively high in all the sensitive categories we examined. For example google-analytics.com has at least 40% coverage across all sensitive categories, including Porn, where it is above 60% and not far from its corresponding coverage across TopK domains. e second part of each subplot indicates the "inclusion" hop count for each tracker: 0 hops corresponding to direct inclusion by the rst party domain, 1 hop, inclusion by another third party that is itself directly included by the 1st party, and so on. We see that the majority of trackers are directly included by the 1st party, some are included at 1 hop, few at 2 hops, and a very small percentage at more than 2 hops. A direct 0 hop inclusion e ectively means that a tracking domain knows without doubt that it is present at the corresponding (sensitive) domain. With additional recursive inclusion, a tracking domain may or may not know who the 1st party domain is, depending on how the inclusion was done.
In summary, despite the special nature of sensitive domains, and the restrictions put by data protection regulation around them, sensitive domains are intensely tracked by mainstream tracking service who undoubtedly are aware of their presence on such sites.
Are there specialized trackers for sensitive domains?
Having seen that the top spots in tracking sensitive domains are occupied by well known trackers, we look further down the list for less known ones. e reason for doing this goes beyond mere curiosity. As explained in [48] , mainstream trackers are under intense media, regulatory, and investigative scrutiny and thus would risk a lot if they behaved carelessly, especially with ma ers relating to sensitive data. On the other hand, large numbers of smaller trackers y totally under the radar and might, thus, prove to be more dangerous. Next, we rst describe brie y how we searched for such trackers, and then proceed to present our ndings.
Methodology.
In order to examine if there exist "niche" third party trackers with a bias towards sensitive categories, we apply the following methodology. We estimate the coverage of a third party tracker in a sensitive category as the number of websites in which we observe it, divided by the total number of websites in the sensitive category. en, we exclude third party trackers with high , , percentage coverage in the rest of websites not belonging to the speci c sensitive category that we consider.
In order to control the number of excluded third party trackers we de ne a maximum coverage threshold "q", such that, if the percentage coverage of a third party tracker on general websites beyond the particular sensitive category that we consider is above "q", we exclude the third party tracker from the list of suspected niche trackers for the category. In Table 6 we report the top 10 niche third party trackers found in each category sorted based on their corresponding coverage within the category. e value of the "q" threshold used is reported next to each category name in the rst row of the table. Table 6 depicts the names and the coverage of the top-10 niche trackers for each sensitive category for di erent values of q. We see that such trackers can achieve up to 14% coverage within a sensitive category. is is much lower than the coverage achieved by mainstream trackers across all domains, which is probably expected given that such trackers serve niche markets and are, themselves, much smaller companies.
Findings.
We manually looked up the discovered trackers and veried that most of them o er tracking services, whereas some declared clearly on their web-sites that they indeed specialize on the categories that we found them to specialize on. For example, medtargetsystem.com, owner of domain dmdconnects.com (position 9 in category Health of Table 6 ) describes clearly its services for medical professionals and web-sites. At position 76 of Health (not depicted on the table) we nd ehealthcaresolutions.com, describing itself as a "a unique marketing platform that specializes in connecting niche audiences with pharmaceutical and healthcare brands". At position 89, tapnative.com, o ers to "promote your content to millions of health-conscious consumers and healthcare professionals exclusively within premium health and wellness websites and around health-related content."
Going over to Politics, on position 3 of Table 6 we nd nationbuilder.com stating on their web-site: "We need more leaders. And be er ones. Wherever you are on your path to leadership, NationBuilder Cities will equip you with valuable tools in real life, starting with scheduled events to help you build community, share stories, and gain the skills and training you need to lead in this era."
At position 96 of Sexual Orientation we nd codeamber.org describing its services as follows: "Who would want a Background Check? Anyone who wants to know more about someone new in their life may well want to run a deep background check on that individual. Whether it's a new boy or girl friend, a new neighbor or someone new in your, or your child's life who may be or become signi cant. Don't take a chance. Get a complete background report on them today.".
Finally, on position 11 of Porn we encounter JuicyAds, self-described as "the sexy advertising network".
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN TRACKERS
In this section, we look at the communication pa erns between trackers operating on sensitive domains. We are particularly interested in investigating whether there are signs of exchange of information between mainstream third party trackers that may hold Personally Identi able Information (PII) for users (email address, rst and last name, etc. ), and niche third party trackers, that typically don't have PII, but may have seen users in a series of sensitive domains.
Cookies Synchronization
Cookie synchronization [11, 18, 60] , or simply CSync, is a well known technique used by Ad and Tracking entities to synchronize pseudonymous user IDs that the di erent entities assign to users. Due to the same origin policy [81] that prevents two third-party domains to directly exchange information between each other, third-party domains need to use alternative methods to exchange information. To bypass the same origin restriction, two third-party domains can synchronize their cookies by passing them as arguments in the URL of an HTTP(S) GET request. e HTTP(S) request is usually towards a small image 1×1 pixel, hosted under the second third-party domain. e cookie of the rst third-party domain is embedded in the request URL as an argument and the cookie of the second third-party domain (for the same user) is embedded in the request header. Note that the default web browser behavior is to include existing cookies belonging to the visited domain in the request header. Upon successful cookie synchronization, the two third-party domains can exchange tracking information in the background related to the same user. us, they enrich , ,
Costas Iordanou, Georgios Smaragdakis, and Nikolaos Laoutaris 
Detecting Cookie Synchronization
To detect CSync, as a rst step, we exclude all requests between third-party domains that do not include any arguments in the URL. en, we lter the URL using a list of keywords that we empirically build related to CSync activities. Some keyword examples are, "usercookie", "external user id", "usermatch", "async usersync", etc. In total, we have 62 keyword. We also exclude URLs with obfuscated arguments since we cannot examine if they include any user related information or cookies. We also assume that all sub-domains belonging to the same top level domain plus one (TLD+1), i.e., "pagead2.googlesyndication.com" and "tpc.googlesyndication.com", can access cookies belonging to the TLD+1 "googlesyndication.com", thus, by default they can share information for the same user. More advance CSync detection techniques [11, 60] can also be incorporated in our methodology, nevertheless, comparing our results with those reported in [60] we observe that the percentage of additional CSync requests is relatively small. Note that since we collect data with a crawler that has full control of the web browser we can also analyse HTTPS requests.
Statistics on Cookie Synchronization
Next, we turn our a ention towards "who talks to whom?". In Table 7 we report the number of websites, across categories including, the TopK and the ve sensitive categories ( rst column), where we identi ed cookie synchronization in our study. e second and third column depicts the number of websites and the number of domains in each category, respectively. e forth column the number of websites we detect atleast one CSync instance, and h column the corresponding percentage.
When we turn our a ention to the percentage of websites with synchronization ( h column), we notice that this varies signi cantly across di erent categories. Around 19% of popular websites (TopK) host third parties that exchange information using cookie synchronization. In websites belonging to the sensitive categories this percentage is signi cantly lower, typically below 10%, with the exception of Health, in which 27% of the websites we examined host third parties that participate in cookie synchronization. On the other extreme, in Porn, only 0.4% of websites host third parties that participate in cookie synchronization.
With respect to HTTP(S) requests involved in cookie synchronization (column six, seven and eight). For the popular TopK websites, the percentage of HTTP(S) requests that are used for cookies synchronization is 1.58%. Our results agree with other recent studies that studied cookie synchronization, e.g., the one in [60] , where the authors reported that 1.47% of the HTTP requests generated from 850 real mobile users over one year are used for cookie synchronization. Again, comparing the percentages of the sensitive categories with the TopK, we observer much lower percentages is sensitive categories.
Column nine shows the absolute number of CSync pairs that we detect in each category. We observe that in TopK we detect 2,460 pairs followed by Health with 327 and Religion with 296 pairs. e rest of the categories are below 200 pairs.
Next, in columns ten and eleven we show the absolute number (column ten) of CSync pairs between the niche tracking domains reported in Table 6 and the percentage of CSync pairs in each category belonging to those trackers. We observe that Health and Political Beliefs have 12.8% and 11.7% of CSync pairs involved with niche trackers of each category, respectively.
In summary, cookie synchronization is less common in sensitive websites (except Health), than in popular ones. Porn is a sensitive category where the cookie synchronization is rare. Nevertheless, there is exchange of information between mainstream trackers (that have PII) and niche trackers that don't have PII but have seen people on sensitive domains. Given that the la er y largely under the radar, and may be prone to more risky exploitation plans for the data they collect, we nd such exchange of information worrisome. , ,
Limitations
We believe that most of the cookie synchronizations between trackers are visible in our study. We, however, can not exclude other types of communication between trackers, e.g., backend server-to-server communication based on private contracts, that are not visible within the browser (In our case, our crawler). Moreover, trackers are added in the webpages and new contracts for exchange of information between them are signed at a regular basis. us, in Table 7 , we report lower bounds based on a snapshot of the cookie synchronization activity, as we observe in our study.
RELATED WORK
A substantial amount of work has touched upon web tracking across di erent platforms, such as, desktop computers [8, 10, 32, 49, 62, 72, 78] , mobile phones and tablets [13, 42, 50, 63] or mixed platforms (Mobile apps and Web interfaces) [34, 50, 63] .
More speci cally, Lerner et. al., [49] study the evolution of web tracking over time (1996 ( -2016 measure the extend of web tracking in the top 1 Million websites. e authors in [9, 10] study the privacy impact of web tracking and web ads. In a similar path, the authors in [8, 34, 62, 78 ] study the impact on web tracking when using AdBlocking tools. With respect to personal data leakage, the authors in [42, 69] study the leakage of Personal Identi able Information (PII). Another aspect of the web tracking recently studied is the geographic location of tracking servers [32, 41, 63] .
Few studies include results on tracking of sensitive domains [17, 41, 54, 63, 80] . In these works the study of sensitive domains is just a small part of a longer study. Some works looking on tracking and targeting of minors and COPPA related violations also fall in the area of sensitive domain tracking [64] . Compared with all these works our results have greater scale (# sensitive domains examined, # sensitive categories), greater generality (our methodology can easily be adapted to monitoring arbitrary sensitive categories), and ask questions that have not been asked before ("are tracking domains aware that they operate on sensitive domains?", "are there specialized trackers?", "do specialized trackers talk to mainstream ones?").
Text and Web domain classi cation includes a large body of scienti c literature (see [45] for a recent survey) as well as several commercial services, both standalone [5, 68] , or as parts of the campaign planers of online advertising services [35] . Such services are payment based and opaque as far as their internals are concerned. Also, most of them avoid including very sensitive terms since this would constitute an obvious violation of data protection rules (referring to campaign planners). Web-domain and text based classi cation are huge areas upon which we draw tools like TF-IDF [66] and BoW [44] for feature engineering, Naïve Bayes algorithm [2] for classi cation, etc. Our contribution in the area is more on terms of how we combine things together rather on fundamental tools. Curlie.org [23] is an ideal taxonomy for nding large lists of sensitive domains really fast, even manually, due to the hierarchical organization of the information. By combining the above with the previously mentioned tools it is easy to produce accurate classi ers for automatically identifying large sensitive domains among arbitrary lists of domains on the open web.
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed methodology in this work is the rst generic methodology that allows a quick and easy way to identify a large number of websites belonging to di erent categories, with a minimal e ort to bootstrap and use. e simplicity and generality of the proposed methodology makes it suitable for a plethora of applications in the measurement community to measure and analyse websites based on di erent categories or similarities.
is generality can be achieved during the training phase of the classi er by selecting training samples related to the topic of interest or any other common characteristics of the websites depending on the goals of each study. In this paper, we showcase just a simple example, how to use it in order to monitor web tracking on sensitive websites as de ned by GDPR in Europe.
CONCLUSION
Given the recent intense debates around data protection, we've been surprised to nd so many tracking services operating on carefully identi ed sensitive domains. Of course, one may arrive to such domains accidentally by, say, clicking on the wrong link, or because one's device has been hacked. Most visits, however, are intentional, and, therefore, reveal sensitive information about the visitor. Our work has shown that in the majority of cases, it is the owners of such sites that intentionally include tracking code in order to participate in advertising revenue sharing programs of large and small online advertising companies. Such companies, given the direct inclusion of their tracking code by the site owner, are clearly aware of their presence on such sites. To avoid being there, they would have to refuse admission to their revenue sharing programs to sites that handle sensitive topics. is would require some manual ltering but, as our work has demonstrated, most of the e ort can be automated. On the other hand, operators of such sites need to receive revenue to keep their sites going, and this implies participation in ad revenue sharing platforms. Perhaps, there should be a special way to handle tracking and advertising for sensitive domains. We intent to examine such ideas as part of our future work.
